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The History and Revival of the Corporate
Purpose Clause
Elizabeth Pollman*
The corporate purpose debate is experiencing a renaissance. The contours
of the modern debate are relatively well developed and typically focus on
whether corporations should pursue shareholder value maximization or broader
social aims. A related subject that has received much less scholarly attention,
however, is the formal legal mechanism by which a corporation expresses its
purpose—the purpose clause of the corporate charter. This Article examines
corporate purpose through the evolution of corporate charters. Starting with
historical examples ranging from the Dutch East India Company to early
American corporations and their modern twenty-first century parallels, the
discussion illuminates how corporate purpose has been expressed within the
charter in a changing series of practices.
Examining this evolution reveals that throughout history, the sovereign
state has firmly held the reins on the legal statement of corporate purpose by
determining it as a matter of special grant or by requiring its articulation in the
constitutional document establishing the corporation. Early corporate charters
included provisions for self-governance and purpose that served as a
coordinating mechanism for long-term ventures and associations, often serving
public and private interests. Over the nineteenth century, as state legislatures
looked to solve their corruption problem and powerful business players pressed
for greater operational freedom, the purpose clause of the corporate charter lost
its specificity, and awareness of its public-tinged character diminished.
Corporations increasingly relied on private documents and intangible, branded
personas to create corporate identity, capture philosophies of corporate mission,
and express social-minded aims. Throughout this long history, however, and
despite waning attention paid to corporate purpose clauses at times, they have
remained an important reflection of the public–private collaboration at the heart
of the corporate enterprise. Further, the longstanding requirement of stating a
purpose in the corporate charter has laid the groundwork for a contemporary
revival in understanding its relevance to the corporate law doctrine of good faith
and its utility as a mechanism for creating and coordinating commitments for the
benefit corporation. The purpose clause has enduring relevance even as new

* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. For valuable comments, I thank
Albert Churella, David Ciepley, Mark Lebovitch, Mark Roe, Susan Salzstein, Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
Harwell Wells, and participants of the symposium hosted by the Institute for Law and Economic
Policy and the Texas Law Review. I am especially grateful for the detailed comments and corporate
charters shared by Eric Hilt.
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practices and understandings of corporate purpose have emerged in business
and law.

Introduction
A great assortment of meanings has come to attach to the term
“corporate purpose.” For many, it invokes the longstanding corporate law
debate about whether directors should manage the corporation to maximize
shareholders’ economic interests or whether directors instead ought to
consider other social aims.1 Over time this debate became a heated battle over
“shareholder primacy” and “stakeholder governance,” with business leaders,
judges, politicians, and academics weighing in.2 And to others, corporate
purpose is better thought of as a business issue, or perhaps a moral one, rather
than a doctrinal legal question.3 Corporate purpose broadly concerns the role
of corporations in society.
This Article examines a related subject that has received much less
scholarly attention—the corporate purpose clause of the charter. This clause,
or set of provisions, is the formal legal mechanism by which a corporation
expresses its purpose in its highest constitutive document that is filed with
the state. As corporations often take advantage of broad enabling statutes that
allow for an unspecified statement of pursuing “any lawful purpose,” many
have come to view corporate purpose clauses as meaningless relics of a
bygone era. Engaging in a deeper exploration of the corporate purpose clause,
however, reveals that it would be a mistake to underestimate its historic role,
contemporary relevance, and future potential.

1. For classic work in this literature, see generally Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as
Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); and Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate
Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932).
2. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder
Governance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 94 (2020) (arguing against “the flaws and dangers” of
“stakeholder governance”); Edward Rock, For Whom Is the Corporation Managed in 2020?: The
Debate over Corporate Purpose, 1–4 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper
No. 515, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3589951 [https://perma.cc/
BQ9T-3546] (summarizing the contemporary corporate purpose debate including statements and
proposals from academics, business leaders, and politicians); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Restoration: The
Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy:
A Reply to Professor Rock, 76 BUS. LAW. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 5–6), https://
scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2238/ [https://perma.cc/UH23-U988] (arguing that
the American corporate governance system “needs an overhaul to fit a 21st century economy”).
3. See, e.g., COLIN MAYER, PROSPERITY: BETTER BUSINESS MAKES THE GREATER GOOD 6
(2019) (discussing corporate purpose in terms of fulfilling business objectives rather than
maximizing profits and noting related social and moral values in corporate purpose); The British
Academy, The Future of the Corporation: Principles for Purposeful Business (Nov. 2019), https://
www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/publications/future-of-the-corporation-principles-for-purposefulbusiness/ [https://perma.cc/4PTA-H83H] (examining the case for reforming business “around its
purposes, trustworthiness, values and culture” and solving the problems of “people and planet”).
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Part I begins with the early history of purpose clauses in corporate
charters, from European churches and trading companies to colonial and
early American municipalities and business corporations. Two main points
emerge. First, incorporation often allowed, and indeed necessitated, a
framework for self-governance given the separate legal personality of the
corporation. The expression of specific corporate purposes in the corporate
charter served as a coordinating mechanism for this governance of long-term
ventures and associations. Second, the expression of purpose in corporate
charters reflected collaboration between what we now think of as public and
private spheres.
Part II continues this exploration by tracing the century-long shift from
special chartering to general incorporation statutes and from granting specific
state-articulated purpose provisions to allowing generic, privately articulated
purpose clauses. During the period when special legislative acts were
required to grant corporate charters, the purpose clause reflected the joining
together of private actors seeking a charter for a specifically requested type
of activity and a public grant approving such request and giving it legal
effect—often with special privileges and expectations of specified quasipublic actions. Under a system of general incorporation, the state sets
parameters of authorized activity, and within these parameters private
participants may customize their use of the corporate form.
In the wake of these profound regulatory changes and the provision of
greater operational freedom, corporations found new ways of expressing their
values and purposes outside of the formal legal charter. From branded goods
and corporate personas to corporate philanthropy, social initiatives, and
mission statements, corporations continued to create mechanisms for
coordinating participants’ activity and navigating public expectations. The
purpose clause of the corporate charter lost much of its specificity during the
mid-to-late 1800s, and awareness of its public-tinged character declined but
was not entirely lost.
Finally, Part III examines the enduring relevance of the purpose clause
through the duty of good faith and the benefit corporation form. These
examples echo the lessons from earlier times, demonstrating that the
corporate purpose clause remains a tool for coordinating long-term ventures
and associations, and it still reflects that the corporation is a collaboration
between public and private spheres.
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The Early History of Purpose Clauses in Corporate Charters

A charter is “a written instrument that authorizes and limits a
government [or corporation] and establishes its offices and procedures.”4 The
legal and social technology of chartering has existed for over a millennium,
with roots in the ancient Roman state, and with practices evolving through
“reciprocal modeling” between government and corporate charters over
many centuries.5 For most of this history, the grant of a corporate charter has
required a special act by a sovereign power.6 Under this system of special
chartering, corporate charters were granted one by one, and each charter was
tailored to the specific activity contemplated by the corporation’s organizers.7
Particular corporate powers and privileges were explicitly enumerated in the
charter.8
Ecclesiastical, educational, charitable, and municipal corporations were
far more common than business corporations for most of corporate history.9
In medieval Europe, the Church, the kingdom, and many towns were

4. David Ciepley, Corporate Directors as Purpose Fiduciaries: Reclaiming the Corporate Law
We Need, 2 (July 25, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3426747 [https://perma.cc/9U85-92VJ]. See also RONALD E. SEAVOY,
THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION, 1784–1855, at 276 (1982) (defining a
“charter of incorporation” as an “act of a legislature creating a corporation”).
5. Ciepley, supra note 4, at 1–2. See also Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial
Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502, 538–39 (2006) (tracing the origins of constitutional interpretation and
judicial review to seventeenth-century practices of interpreting corporate charters); Nikolas Bowie,
Why the Constitution Was Written Down, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1397, 1397, 1402, 1405–07 (2019)
(describing how the corporate charter of the Massachusetts Bay Company, which governed most of
New England from 1629 to 1686, evolved into a “Constitution” and subsequently “written words
became a defining feature of American constitutionalism”); Pauline Maier, The Revolutionary
Origins of the American Corporation, 50 WM. & MARY Q. 51, 79 (1993) (“[Corporate] charters and
constitutions were understood as essentially the same. . . . The close relationship of charters with
constitutions meant that debates over the internal structure of corporations and the management of
power . . . could easily draw on precedents from state and federal constitutions.”); Geoffrey P.
Miller, The Corporate Law Background of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 79 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1, 2–6 (2010) (describing parallel practices between the U.S. Constitution and corporate
charters of the time).
6. Joseph Stancliffe Davis, Essays in the Earlier History of American Corporations, in 16
HARVARD ECONOMIC STUDIES 8 (1917). See also ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 130 (1932) (“As in the Eighteenth Century
negotiations for these contracts were carried on with the crown, so in America they were carried on
with the sovereign power of the various states as successors to the crown. In practice this meant the
state legislature.”).
7. See J.W. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1780–1970, at 2–3 (1970) (describing early special chartering practices).
8. See id. at 2–3, 9, 15–16 (describing special privileges bestowed in corporate charters and that
the charter “authoritatively fixed the scope and content of corporate organization”).
9. Maier, supra note 5, at 53.
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corporations.10 The sovereign granting charters was typically the Pope, King,
or Parliament, directly or by delegated authority.11
Operating through the chartered corporation form provided several
important benefits. To start, when a corporate charter is granted, “the law
immediately recognizes the existence of a new legal entity that is separate
from the organizers . . . that can carry out certain . . . activities as a
‘person.’”12 The separate legal personality of a “corpus,” or corporate body,
evolved out of laws and practices in Europe during the Middle Ages
concerning churches and universities.13 Separate legal personality enabled
the corporation to hold property, contract, and sue and be sued in its own
name.14 Further, the legal personality of the corporation meant that it could
have a potentially perpetual and separate existence from its participants.15 For
religious institutions, as an example, having these features of separate legal
personality:
ensured that the property would not be handed down to heirs of
individual persons who controlled and managed the property on behalf
of the institutions (such as bishops or abbots), nor would the property
revert to the estate of the lord or be heavily taxed when those
controlling persons died or were replaced.16
Church property could be owned by a corporate body (or bodies), and it
would “be managed ad utilitatem ecclesiae, ‘for the advantage of the
Church,’” which was understood to be eternal.17

10. Ciepley, supra note 4, at 1; RON HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW:
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATION, 1720–1844, at 16–17 (2000) (noting that by
the sixteenth century, corporations were used for “the King himself, cities and boroughs, guilds,
universities and colleges, hospitals and other charitables, bishops, deans and chapters, abbots and
convents, and other ecclesiastical bodies”).
11. Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood & the Corporate Persona, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV.
785, 788 (2013); Ciepley, supra note 4, at 1–2; HURST, supra note 7, at 3.
12. Blair, supra note 11, at 786.
13. Id. at 789; see also Ciepley, supra note 4, at 26 (“The recovery of the Roman law of
corporations in the 11th century revitalized the Church’s use of the corporate form, which, after
adaptation by canon lawyers, was deployed to reform, and create, a host of corporate bodies—
monasteries, nunneries, cathedral chapters, bishoprics, confraternities, universities, and so on—
which mushroomed across Europe.”).
14. Maier, supra note 5, at 54 (“[I]ncorporation allowed a group to make binding rules for its
self-government, to function in law as a single person with the right to hold property and to sue and
be sued—and so to protect its assets—and to persist after the lifetimes of its founding members.”).
15. HURST, supra note 7, at 19; Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law
Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 425 (2003).
Additional benefits of incorporation, such as limited liability, developed over time. See, e.g.,
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE & M. TODD HENDERSON, LIMITED LIABILITY: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 19–21 (2016) (describing the development of limited liability).
16. Blair, supra note 11, at 789.
17. Ciepley, supra note 4, at 26–27.
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Incorporation also allowed, and indeed often necessitated, a framework
for self-governance. A “corporation sole,” such as the King, had a natural
capacity and a corporate capacity.18 Such corporations sole might have
required little in terms of governance, but for any corporation with more than
one member or officeholder, some mechanism was required for determining
who could take actions on the corporation’s behalf and how the corporation
was to operate.19
Some corporate charters dating back to the Middle Ages, such as for
municipalities, explicitly provided for self-governance.20 Similarly, the
famous seventeenth-century trading companies of England and the
Netherlands were expressly created to allow a group of merchants to
collectively use monopoly rights granted over certain shipping trade routes.21
The “letters patent” of the Dutch East India Company (VOC), for instance,
specified merchants from different regions who formed a “Council of
Seventeen” and who served as a governing board that had prescribed
governance duties.22
Critical to this self-governance function was the expression of specific
corporate purposes. Even the oldest European charters that we have in the

18. Ciepley, supra note 4, at 1 (citing SUSAN REYNOLDS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY
(1977)).
19. Blair, supra note 11, at 787–88 (“Although corporations are not often regarded primarily as
units of governance, in fact, self-governance was one of the earliest purposes of incorporation.”).
See also Paul B. Miller, Corporate Personality, Purpose, and Liability, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON CORPORATE PURPOSE AND PERSONHOOD (Elizabeth Pollman & Robert B. Thompson eds.)
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 4) (https://ssrn.com/abstract=3707670) (explaining that the
personification of corporations implies fiduciary representation and requires the law to enable
attribution of legal agency and liability); SEAVOY, supra note 4, at 4 (“[I]ncorporation provided a
means of centralized management . . . .”); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins
of the Corporate Board of Directors, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89, 126–29 (2004) (discussing early use
of the corporate form by merchant guilds that used governing boards to determine trading rules for
certain goods or regions).
20. Blair, supra note 11, at 790 (citing JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 37–40 (1832)).
21. Blair, supra note 11, at 791.
22. VERENIGDE OOSTINDISCHE COMPAIGNIE [VOC], CHARTER OF THE DUTCH EAST INDIA
COMPANY 2 (Rupert Gerritsen ed., Peter Reynders trans., Australasian Hydrographic Society 2011)
(1602) (describing the VOC board composition and indicating that “[w]henever the
abovementioned Board meets, it shall determine when the equipping of ships will occur and how
many, where they shall be sent and other matters relating to the trade”). See also STEPHEN R. BOWN,
MERCHANT KINGS: WHEN COMPANIES RULED THE WORLD, 1600–1900, at 27–28 (2009)
(describing the formation and governance of the Dutch East India Company); Daniel Gerstell,
Administrative Adaptability: The Dutch East India Company and Its Rise to Power, EMORY
UNIV. 51 (1991), http://history.emory.edu/home/documents/endeavors/volume3/DanielGerstell.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UW6L-TA6F] (describing how the “1602 Charter was revolutionary in granting
such relative sovereignty to a state-backed company, [and] drew heavily upon the political structures
outlined by the United Provinces”). For a discussion of using the modern terminology of “charter”
to refer to what was historically called “letters patent,” see Bowie, supra note 5, at 1410 n.60.
OF ENGLISH MEDIEVAL TOWNS 113–14
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historical record contain “the kernel of a purpose clause”23 and reference to a
mode for governance. As political scientist David Ciepley has highlighted,
the charter of the monastery of Rebais, from the year 625, refers to the
purpose of a collective group of monks performing intercessory prayer,
“living under the holy rule,” and in service “to God for the state of the church
and the well-being of the King and the fatherland.”24
Although these points concerning the self-governance and purpose
aspects of charters are not often connected in the literature,25 we can
understand that they were highly linked in their functional importance for
early corporations as a coordinating mechanism. Further, the expression of
purpose in corporate charters reflected collaboration between what we now
think of as public and private spheres. It is worth expanding on each of these
ideas as they are central to this Article’s observations.
First, in addition to frequently conveying special privileges or
monopolies,26 the stated purpose or purposes of the corporation in the charter
also served as a coordinating mechanism for long-term ventures and
associations. As the participants involved in guilds, towns, churches,
eleemosynary organizations, and trading companies continually changed,27
their purpose need not when it was established by charter and when a measure
of self-governance toward fulfilling that purpose was explicitly or implicitly
understood as part of the grant. Particularly during a time when corporations
were not categorized by distinctions such as public and private, or for-profit
and non-profit,28 the charter conveyed essential information about the ends
to which the corporation would be operated, property deployed, and so on.
The charter organized and limited the powers of the institution, thereby
creating commitments and limiting managerial discretion. Without a

23. Ciepley, supra note 4, at 29.
24. Id. at 30 (citing 2 J.M. PARDESSUS, DIPLOMATA, CHARTAE, EPISTOLAE, LEGES 39–41,
no. 275 (1849) and crediting Albrecht Diem for translation).
25. An important exception is literature by scholars connecting these points to argue that
fiduciary duties run to the corporation itself and its authorized purposes rather than to shareholders.
See Ciepley, supra note 4, at 3 (arguing that corporate directors “have duties not to specific persons,
such as the stockholders, but to the corporation and its purposes”). See also Paul B. Miller & Andrew
S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 536 (2015) (discussing “how
different theories of the firm imply that corporations are administered on the basis of fiduciary
service and fiduciary governance mandates respectively”).
26. HURST, supra note 7, at 17, 20.
27. Blair, supra note 11, at 792 (discussing the stability the corporate form offered amid changes
in membership and investors).
28. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 457–58 (1765) (noting
distinctions between corporations as either “sole” or “aggregate” and “ecclesiastical or “lay” with
the latter including both “civil” and “eleemosynary” corporations). See also Jonathan Levy, From
Fiscal Triangle to Passing Through: Rise of the Nonprofit Corporation, in CORPORATIONS AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 213, 217–20 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J. Novak eds., 2017)
(examining the development of the distinction between for-profit and non-profit corporations).
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developed body of corporate law,29 there would not be an external legal
source to establish the default boundaries or paradigmatic expectations of a
corporation’s purpose.30 As an “artificial” or “legal” being, the corporation
did not have a purpose or operational imperative as a matter of natural law.
Second, we can understand that the purpose provisions in the charter
reflected some measure of collaboration between public and private actors.
During the period of special chartering, the starting point in the dynamic was
a private actor or group petitioning for the corporate charter, and in so doing,
advocating for certain desired grants. Their petition was an expression of
entrepreneurial action. The sovereign actor would then decide whether to
grant the requested charter, and if so, upon what terms and for what purposes.
Evidence of this collaboration sometimes appeared in the charter through
language justifying the grant of corporate privileges or explaining the public
benefit the corporation would provide. And although modern commentators
use the notion of a “purpose clause,” historic examples often were not framed
in terms of a standardized or singular provision and could appear as a
preamble or grant of a monopoly or franchise for a particular activity.
Returning to the Dutch East India Company (VOC) to illustrate this
public–private collaboration, its preamble contains several paragraphs
explaining the importance of the shipping and trade commerce to the
“prosperity of the United Netherlands” and the “great cost, effort and
difficulties” incurred by the merchants founding companies to pursue these
ventures.31 It continues:
This was considered by us, the States General, and given due weight
in recognising how much importance to the united provinces and the
good residents thereof was thereto attached that this shipping trade and
commerce be maintained and allowed to increase through application
of an appropriate general organisation of its policy, our mutual
relations and administration.32
Further:
The Directors of the abovementioned companies were thence invited
to consult with us and propose that these companies be united . . . .

29. HURST, supra note 7, at 7 (“[T]he first English treatise on corporations (Kyd 1794) has little
to say, and scant authority to cite, concerning the use of the corporation for economic enterprise. . . .
[and] to the end of the eighteenth century in the United States law had developed no separate policy
or rules on business corporations . . . .”).
30. For a discussion of how corporate purpose could also serve as a mediating device to attribute
corporate liability, see Miller, supra note 19, at 19; and as a mode of fiduciary governance, see
Ciepley, supra note 4, at 3; and Miller & Gold, supra note 25, at 524–25.
31. VERENIGDE OOSTINDISCHE COMPAIGNIE [VOC], CHARTER OF THE DUTCH EAST INDIA
COMPANY 1 (Rupert Gerritsen ed., Peter Reynders trans., Australasian Hydrographic Society 2011)
(1602).
32. Id.
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Through the creation of a fixed, secure and orderly entity they will be
bonded together, managed and expanded for the good of all the
residents of the united provinces who would like to participate in it.33
Following “various discussions, explanatory sessions, and reports,” and
after having “conducted due deliberations taking into consideration the
progress, service and welfare of the united provinces,” the States General
approved “on the basis of [their] sovereign power and authority,” a grant of
specified privileges.34 Such privileges were articulated in the letters patent
through a series of expressly described self-governance mechanisms and a
“licence” of exclusive sailing and trading rights for a period of time.35 In
short, self-governance and purpose were intertwined to coordinate the
corporation’s activity and participants, and the language of the grant evinced
a connection between public and private spheres of activity and purposes.36
Turning to the North American colonies, the same chartering process,
with articulated purposes, was used for the colonies themselves, cities such
as New York (previously New Amsterdam), and other corporations in the
colonies.37 To take one example, The Philadelphia Contributionship for
Insuring Houses from Loss by Fire was formed to serve as a mutual insurance
company “for our own mutual security, as for the common security and
advantage of our fellow-citizens and neighbors, and for the promoting of so
great and publick a good as the insurance of houses from loss by fire,” and
became the first American business corporation when it was granted a charter
in 1768.38
After the American Revolution, state legislatures took over the task of
chartering corporations and did so in greater numbers and for a greater

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 6. Notably, the VOC’s self-governance function expressly allowed for the appointment
of extraordinary, state-like powers: “They may appoint governors, keep armed forces, install
Judicial officers and officers for other essential services so to keep the establishments in good order,
as well as jointly ensure enforcement of the law and justice, all combined so as to promote trade.”
Id.
36. For a discussion of the transformation of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) to a “fullyfledged business corporation,” see David Ciepley, The Anglo-American Misconception of
Stockholders as ‘Owners’ and ‘Members’: Its Origins and Consequences, 16 J. INSTITUTIONAL
ECON. 623, 635 (2019).
37. David B. Guenther, Of Bodies Politic and Pecuniary: A Brief History of Corporate Purpose,
9 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 1, 15–18 (2019). See also Bowie, supra note 5, at
1415–16 (describing the charter of the Massachusetts Bay Company, its “1,500-word recital of why
it was created,” and “2,500 words [dedicated] to the corporation’s organization”).
38. Commonwealth ex rel. Todd v. Philadelphia Contributionship, 88 A. 929, 929 (Pa. 1913);
Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, Part II, 2 HARV. L.
REV. 149, 165 (1888).
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diversity of organizations than had the King or Parliament.39 Although the
corporate form was used for a wide variety of activity, ranging from what we
might think of in modern terms as for-profit, non-profit, and governmental in
nature, no legal distinctions were drawn among them at early American
common law, and chartering continued on an individual basis done by special
act.40 Legislatures and their committees for corporate chartering handled
petitions from municipal, ecclesiastical, charitable, and educational
organizations, as well as transportation, banks, insurance, and manufacturing
companies.41 The privileges and powers granted varied from one charter to
another, depending on the “vagaries of individual bill drafters.”42 These
charters typically listed “a relatively narrow and specific set of corporate
purposes.”43 Provisions setting forth powers, and explicit limitations on
powers, further elucidated the scope of the grant for the specified purpose.
Charters, and specifically their purpose provisions, continued to serve
as coordinating mechanisms for long-term ventures and associations, and
reflected public–private collaboration. As to the first point, purpose clauses
in early American charters often encompassed both an aspect of granting
special privileges and expecting special action, around which the state and
corporate participants organized their activity. States often provided
monopoly privileges in charters, with an aim of engaging private investment
in utility-like projects serving the public.44 Business corporations also often
39. Blair, supra note 11, at 793. While the concept of corporate chartering was well-known
from European experience and transferred or imported into practice in the new nation, the corporate
law that applied to business corporations developed largely after independence. HURST, supra note
7, at 8 (“[W]hen we began making important use of the corporation for business in the United States
from about 1780, there was little relevant legal experience on which to draw. . . . [W]e built public
policy toward the corporation almost wholly out of our own wants and concerns, shaped primarily
by our own institutions.”); Maier, supra note 5, at 52 (“The precociousness of corporate
development in the United States meant that legislators and jurists could not simply follow European
models but were forced to innovate.”).
40. See, e.g., Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800,
Part I, 2 HARV. L. REV. 105, 105 (1888) (“The most striking peculiarity found on first examination
of the history of the law of business corporations is the fact that different kinds of corporations are
treated without distinction, and, with few exceptions, as if the same rules were applicable to all
alike.”); SEAVOY, supra note 4, at 5 (“The earliest method of creating a corporation was by granting
an individual charter.”).
41. Davis, supra note 6, at 4; HURST, supra note 7, at 7. See also Maier, supra note 5, at 55
(“Nowhere were corporations more alike than in the requirement, based on English precedent, that
they serve a public purpose, which the acts of incorporation often specified.”).
42. Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the American Business Corporation, 5 J.
ECON. HIST. 1, 14 (1945).
43. Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights:
Separation of Ownership and Consumption, 123 YALE L.J. 948, 987 (2014).
44. Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. CORP.
L. 33, 51 n.75 (2006) (quoting OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY FLUG HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A
STUDY OF THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS, 1774–
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enjoyed delegations of governmental authority, such as eminent domain
powers, authority to set toll rates, and the like.45
The charter provisions setting out these privileges and powers
functioned as an articulation of the corporation’s purpose, which investors
relied upon and could enforce through the developing ultra vires doctrine.46
Particularly for local merchants, farmers, and landholders who used services
provided by a corporation, the specific nature of the purposes set out in the
charter helped to determine their interests in investing in the corporation and
ensuring that it did not fall into the hands of competitors or monopolists who
would impact the price or availability of their local services.47 Under the ultra
vires doctrine, corporations had to confine their operations to the specific
purpose identified in the charter, and actions outside the scope could be
voided by shareholders or deemed void ab initio.48
In return for grant of a charter, corporations were expected to carry out
their “special action franchises,” using private funds to create infrastructure
or supply essential public goods.49 The remedy of quo warranto allowed a
state to revoke a corporation’s charter where the corporation abused or
neglected its franchise—an imperfect remedy but a powerful last resort.50
1861, at 105 (1947)) (“When neither the government nor any extant body politic was willing or able
to execute a desirable but costly function, the state held out to a new corporation inducements in the
shape of a promise of profits. Such a promise became credible and attractive if fortified by the grant
of a valuable franchise.”); Saule Omarova, The “Franchise” View of the Corporation: Purpose,
Personality, Public Policy, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE PURPOSE AND PERSONHOOD
(Elizabeth Pollman & Robert B. Thompson eds.) (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 7) (“When
scarce private capital is the primary source of funding large-scale public infrastructural and
industrial projects, giving private suppliers of such scarce capital special rights and protections
becomes a publicly beneficial and pragmatic solution.”).
45. HURST, supra note 7, at 20; Harry N. Scheiber, Federalism and the American Economic
Order, 1789–1910, 10 L. & SOC’Y REV. 57, 95 (1975) (discussing the transfer of eminent domain
powers to the private sector).
46. HURST, supra note 7, at 45–47 (discussing public policy objectives of restrictive provisions
in charters including the balance of corporate power in society and protection for investors and
creditors); Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 43, at 987–90 (discussing the ultra vires doctrine).
47. See Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 43, at 953–54, 959, 987–89 (discussing early U.S.
business corporations as “private producers of public goods” and the importance of the ultra vires
doctrine during this time as consumer protection for shareholders in corporations that were
essentially “consumer cooperatives”).
48. Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (With
Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279,
1302 (2001).
49. HURST, supra note 7, at 17, 22–24.
50. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO.
L.J. 1593, 1659–62 (1988) (discussing quo warranto actions by the government against
corporations for “refusal to undertake the investment and business for which the corporation was
designed”). See also Eric Hilt, Early American Corporations and the State, in CORPORATIONS AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 37, 53 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J. Novak eds., 2017) (explaining
the state’s power to dissolve a corporation but noting the power was not frequently used because of
its dire consequences).
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As to the second point regarding public–private collaboration, all
corporations during this period were generally understood, or at least
justified, in terms of serving public or quasi-public purposes.51 The vast
majority of business corporations chartered before 1800 concerned activity
that we now traditionally associate with government infrastructure, such as
transportation companies (canals, turnpikes, bridges, aqueducts) and others
that provided local public services.52 Chartered banking and insurance
corporations were fewer in number, but also relatively common, while
manufacturing corporations were somewhat rare.53
According to Handlin and Handlin, “no grant was forthcoming without
justification in terms of the interests of the state as a whole.”54 Articulated
purposes in corporate charters and related provisions often referred to the
promotion of public welfare. For example, The Phoenix Insurance Company
of New York was chartered in 1807, by petition presented to the legislature,
“to carry on and extend the business of insurances.”55 Its president and
directors had the power on behalf of the company “to make all kinds of
insurance against fire, all kinds of insurance upon the inland transportation
of goods, wares and merchandize, all kinds of marine insurance, and
insurance upon a life or lives, by way of tontine, or otherwise.”56 Further, its
charter explicitly provided “[t]hat this act shall be and is hereby declared to
be a public act, and that the same be for the time herein before limited,
construed in all courts and places benignly and favourably for every
beneficial purpose herein intended.”57 To take another example, the 1809
charter of the Albany Manufacturing Society states that the business was

51. See SEAVOY, supra note 4, at 6 (“Most franchise and benevolent corporations had equal
social utility. . . . A turnpike and church building were both visible and useful public improvements
and all communities needed them.”); id. at 47 (“All communities were also familiar with the benefits
that . . . these types of corporations [religious, benevolent, and business] contributed to public
welfare. They performed functions that the state or local governments were unable or unwilling to
do, and whether they built a church building, schoolhouse, or textile mill, the improvements they
made were highly visible.”).
52. Davis, supra note 6, at 27; Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 43, at 959.
53. Davis, supra note 6, at 27 tbl.3 (finding that by 1800, over three hundred business
corporations had been chartered in the United States, with the greatest number related to
transportation, and others including providers of local public services, bank and insurance,
manufacturing and miscellaneous business). See also SEAVOY, supra note 4, at 50 (describing the
categories of the earliest business charters in the United States).
54. HANDLIN & HANDLIN, supra note 44, at 74.
55. An Act to Incorporate the Phoenix Insurance Company of New York, 1807 N.Y. Laws 13–
15 (on file with author). I thank Eric Hilt for these examples that are typical of the corporate charters
of the period.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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incorporated “for the laudable purposes of promoting and extending the
manufactory of cotton and wood.”58
This point is not meant to suggest, however, that uniform belief existed
about what was actually in the common interest or whether corporations
served public purposes in practice—these topics were the subject of heated
debate.59 The state’s discretion over access to corporate charters and their
contents gave rise to concerns about corruption as powerful political factions
and elites were often the beneficiaries.60 Concerns over corporate power
indeed led to a variety of attempts through charter design itself to limit the
powers granted and to design governance structures to promote
accountability.61 These concerns also eventually led to a transformation of
the chartering process and the specification of corporate purposes, the subject
we turn to next.
II.

From Special Privilege to General Incorporation and the Rise of Other
Expressions of Purpose
It took nearly a century for a full shift to occur across all states from
special chartering to general incorporation statutes, and from granting
specific state-articulated purpose provisions to allowing generic, privately
articulated purpose clauses. Although the corporate law literature often
focuses on the late nineteenth-century liberalization of state corporate law
resulting in the famous race to the top or the bottom, the move to allowing
corporations to state their purpose as “any lawful business” started earlier
through incremental changes in regulatory and chartering practices.
Economic and legal historians have not fully traced the move to allowing
“any lawful business,” but their work has left a trail of notable data points
that this Part draws together to contribute to our understanding. Further, this
Part also explores the rise of other means of expressing corporate mission,

58. An Act to Incorporate the Stockholders of the Albany Manufacturing Society, 1809 N.Y.
Laws 57–61 (on file with author). During the period leading up to the War of 1812 states chartered
larger numbers of manufacturing corporations as part of strong efforts to build domestic
manufacturing in the face of trade restrictions on imported foreign goods. See, e.g., Eric Hilt,
Corporation Law and the Shift Toward Open Access in the Antebellum United States, in
ORGANIZATIONS, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND THE ROOTS OF DEVELOPMENT 147, 152 (Naomi R.
Lamoreaux & John Joseph Wallis eds., 2017).
59. Hilt, supra note 50, at 39–40 (“Although it was the case that the earliest American
corporations were seen as public instrumentalities, whether or not they served the public interest
was a vigorously contested issue at the time.”). See generally Maier, supra note 5, at 58–73
(describing the “anticharter” movement’s concern about corruption, the “aristocratic” granting of
exclusive privileges, and the creation of “a government within a government”).
60. Hilt, supra note 50, at 40.
61. See Maier, supra note 5, at 78 (describing “experimental innovations” in corporate charters
and the inclusion of detailed governance provisions and “safeguards” that made for “increasingly
complex charters”); Ian Speir, Corporations, the Original Understanding, and the Problem of
Power, 10 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 115, 155–56 (2012) (describing innovations in charter design).
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branded personas, and social-minded aims that emerged in the wake of these
changing charter practices, and considers what this tells us about the enduring
relevance of corporate purpose clauses.
A.

The Evolution of Purpose Clauses from Specific to General

The move from special chartering to general incorporation laws was at
core a response to a political problem: state legislatures were manipulating
the creation of valuable special privileges to corrupt the political process and
economy.62 For years, corporate critics had raised concerns that corporations
counted politicians among their shareholders and could use their connections
and economic power to curry favors, block competitors, and entrench
political parties.63 Over time, many citizens grew to see special chartering as
a source of anti-democratic corruption.64 Extending the same opportunity to
incorporate on standard terms to all parties interested in obtaining a corporate
charter solved the problem by eliminating the ability of politicians to
distribute special privileges to the favored few.65
It took many years, however, for this idea to spread, and states began to
experiment in standardizing charters while they were still special chartering
corporations. This likely began as a means of simplifying the legislative
process for creating corporations, which was burdensome on early state
governments with limited administrative capacity.66 Using relatively
standardized boilerplate language in charters in some industries likely also
reduced the burden on states to monitor and enforce the regulations written
into charters.67 To these ends, some states adopted standard forms of charters
for certain types of businesses, such as turnpike corporations and
manufacturing companies.68
From there, beginning in the early nineteenth century, some states
adopted general regulating acts that restricted or eliminated legislative
discretion over the contents of charters in certain industries.69 As historian
Eric Hilt explains, general regulating acts “prevented states from granting
privileges to particular corporations that were not shared by other firms in

62. Jessica L. Hennessey & John Joseph Wallis, Corporations and Organizations in the United
States After 1840, in CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 74, 90 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux
& William J. Novak eds., 2017).
63. Hilt, supra note 50, at 42.
64. Id.
65. Hennessey & Wallis, supra note 62, at 90.
66. Hilt, supra note 50, at 52–53.
67. Id. at 53.
68. William C. Kessler, Incorporation in New England: A Statistical Study, 1800–1875, 8 J.
ECON. HIST. 43, 46–47 (1948); HURST, supra note 7, at 136, 146.
69. Hilt, supra note 50, at 53.
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their industry.”70 At that point, states were not only creating efficiencies by
reducing their administrative burden, they were also limiting political
discretion over the content of corporate charters in particular industries and
thus starting to address the corruption problem. It was just one more leap
from these acts to general incorporation statutes that not only standardized
the contents of charters but also offered access to the corporate form without
a special act of the legislature.71
These reforms, however, posed economic costs.72 As historians Jessica
Hennessey and John Wallis explain, “[a] single set of corporate rules could
not possibly provide the best rules for each organization.”73 And so, after the
first wave of simple forms of general incorporation, states moved in the later
nineteenth century to enable more sophisticated organizational forms to
accommodate the needs of diverse organizations.74
Throughout this slow process of adopting waves of general
incorporation statutes, the language of pursuing “any lawful business” started
to seep into charters and regulatory discourse. For example, Connecticut’s
1837 act, one of the earliest general incorporation statutes, required
specification in the charter of a corporate purpose and broadly allowed “for
the purpose of engaging in and carrying on any kind of manufacturing or
mechanical or mining or quarrying or any other lawful business.”75 Given the
context of the text and time, we might plausibly understand that the drafters
intended this language to indicate a nonexclusive list of industries that could
be pursued, while not authorizing general incorporation for activities that
were limited by other statutes, such as banking, which required a special act
for chartering.76 Another early general incorporation statute from around this
70. Id.
71. Id. Access for all persons to use the corporate form was notably not available in all states,
however. See Eric Hilt, supra note 58, at 155–156 (describing how some Southern states excluded
particular groups, usually non-white persons, from access to their laws).
72. Hennessey & Wallis, supra note 62, at 76.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 1837 Connecticut General Incorporation Act, 1837 Conn. Pub. Acts 49 (on file with author)
(emphasis added) (“The purpose for which every such corporation shall be established, shall be
distinctly and definitely specified by the stockholders in their said articles of association, and it shall
not be lawful for said corporation to direct its operations or appropriate its funds to any other
purpose.”). See also Hilt, supra note 58, at 154 (“[I]n 1837, Connecticut passed a general
incorporation act that was the first to not specifically enumerate the industries that could be pursued,
or to limit the duration of the existence of the corporations it created.”).
76. Connecticut enacted a separate general incorporation statute for banks several years later.
Connecticut Communities and Corporations, Chapt. XXIII, §§ 2–3 (1852). Notably, some current
general incorporation statutes have language referring to “any lawful act” in combination with
language that carves out industries subject to other statutory requirements. See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code
§ 202(b)(1)(A) (West 2015) (“The purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful act or
activity . . . other than the banking business, the trust company business or the practice of a
profession permitted to be incorporated by the California Corporations Code . . .”).
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time, Pennsylvania’s 1836 act, similarly began to ease the pathway to
forming business corporations but did not contain this “any other lawful
business” language.77 It did, however, require the attorney general and the
governor to scrutinize filed certificates of incorporation, and it empowered
the governor to withhold approval if there was any doubt regarding the
“lawfulness” of the proposed enterprise.78
Scholars have observed that the move to general incorporation started
to erode the notion that public utility was the implicit purpose of the
corporation.79 Particularly with the great growth in the number of
manufacturing corporations under general incorporation statutes, many
businesses using the corporate form were no longer engaged in quasi-public,
infrastructure-type projects.80 And as the prevalence of purely investorowned firms increased, some of the early functions of the purpose clause and
ultra vires doctrine declined.81
Under general incorporation, corporate charters and their purpose
provisions still reflected some measure of collaboration between public and
private actors, but such collaboration was more attenuated than in the earlier
period described above. The starting point in the dynamic was still a private
actor or group, but they no longer needed to petition for a special legislative
act and instead could file a corporate charter that they had privately drafted.
If it met the specified requirements of the general incorporation act, the state
approved the grant of the charter.82 At least as a general matter for many
corporate charters, evidence of the public–private collaboration no longer

77. See Susan Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege to General Utility: A Continuation of
Willard Hurst’s Study of Corporations, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 81, 101 n.79 (1999) (authorizing
corporate formation without a special charter for the purpose of “making or manufacturing iron
from the raw material, with coke or mineral coal”) (citing Act of June 16, 1836, ch. CCCLX, 1836
Pa. Laws 746).
78. Hilt, supra note 58, at 153. This statutory language could be interpreted as “merely
enforcing compliance with its terms,” but the discretion granted may have been broad enough to
enable government officials to reject proposed incorporations for other reasons, and Pennsylvania
substantially revised this law in 1849. Id. at 154.
79. See, e.g., Guenther, supra note 37, at 65 (“With general incorporation, the purpose of the
corporation had arguably privatized.”). See also Hovenkamp, supra note 50, at 1636 (“The rise of
general incorporation acts in the 1840s and 1850s rested on the premise that the corporation was no
longer a ‘prerogative of the crown,’ requiring special permission and dedication to public use.”).
80. See Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 43, at 985 (“Manufacturing firms, in contrast to
other types of firms, appear to have been formed under the period’s new free incorporation statutes
in substantial numbers from an early stage [during the early 1800s].”); Hilt, supra note 58, at 152
(describing the rise in manufacturing corporations in the early 1800s and the first wave of general
statutes to encourage domestic manufacturing).
81. Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 43, at 990.
82. See Guenther, supra note 37, at 65–66 (explaining that the shift from special to general
incorporation “constituted a sea change from the early years of the business corporation” as
“[i]ncorporation became a routine and inexpensive procedure outside the realm of political
influence”).
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explicitly appeared in language justifying the grant of corporate privileges or
explaining the public benefit the corporation would provide.
Further, for many business organizers and their investors, the
articulation of specific corporate purposes in a charter became less valuable
as a coordinating mechanism and more of a hindrance to expanding into
different business lines when opportunities arose. Ultra vires was a
commonly litigated issue that required courts to finely parse charter
provisions, often resulting in complicated and inconsistent applications.83
And, as Henry Hansmann and Mariana Pargendler explain, the early
prevalence of consumer cooperative-like business corporations, in which the
shareholders were the consumers of local services, gave way to a new reality
in which investor-owned firms dominated the corporate landscape.84 As they
observe, “If what a shareholder expects from the firm is not a specific product
or service, but a profit—the fungible good par excellence—the precise
purposes and activities specified in a corporate charter should be
comparatively less important.”85 Flexibility to pivot or expand the business
in response to changing markets and technological advances became a greater
priority, and businesses took advantage to craft more general purpose clauses
when the law so allowed.86
Powerful business interests also actively pushed for greater flexibility
of purpose in their charters. Most notably, local railroads were undergoing
major transformations in the mid-nineteenth century and quickly bumped up
against the constraints of their purpose clauses. According to one source,
state legislatures could not keep up with railroad corporations’ demands for
legislative amendments to special charters as routes changed and companies
merged.87 Some railroads used their political influence and resources to avoid
constraints. For example, as the Pennsylvania Railroad grew to embrace a
grand vision of connecting a nationwide railway system, its business leaders
recognized that a major obstacle was navigating political and regulatory
challenges that started with its narrow corporate charter, which specifically
incorporated it only for railroad transportation within the state.88 After
83. Harwell Wells, The Life (and Death?) of Corporate Waste, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1239,
1246–47 (2017).
84. Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 43, at 990.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Guenther, supra note 37, at 56–57 (citing E. MERRICK DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS
CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860 WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MASSACHUSETTS 134–45 (1954)). See
also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1790–1860, at 137 (1977)
(discussing the activity of railroad corporations and their rising influence).
88. TED NACE, GANGS OF AMERICA: THE RISE OF CORPORATE POWER AND THE DISABLING
OF DEMOCRACY 58 (2003); PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD, CHARTERS AND SUPPLEMENTS OF THE
PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY, WITH THE ACTS OF ASSEMBLY AND MUNICIPAL
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investing many years and resources to become a “political juggernaut” in
Pennsylvania, one of the railroad’s many efforts to work around its charter’s
limitations involved convincing the legislature to grant it a charter for a
holding corporation established for general business purposes, through which
it bought up other railway lines outside the state.89 Its expansion indeed relied
upon a variety of holding companies and legislative approval for the issuance
of additional stock.90
Around the time that the Pennsylvania Railroad started in these
endeavors, many states began to follow the early adopters of general
incorporation statutes, and some used broad statutory language referring to
“any lawful business.”91 Thus, “[a]lthough the earliest general incorporation
laws sometimes provided a relatively narrow list of specific manufacturing
enterprises permitted to use the statutes, by 1875, the statutes tended to allow
all lawful businesses to incorporate under the general laws . . . .”92 To the
extent statutes listed exceptions, they tended to be for railroads and banks,
which raised interstate commerce concerns, and for municipalities, which
were perceived as purely public entities.93
Notably, the move toward general incorporation acts with only the
minimal threshold of a lawful purpose coincided with the development of a
new conceptual classification delineating corporations as either “for-profit”

ORDINANCES AFFECTING THE COMPANY; TOGETHER WITH THE BY-LAWS OF THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS 7 (1859).
89. NACE, supra note 88, at 61, 63; ALBERT J. CHURELLA, THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD,
VOLUME 1: BUILDING AN EMPIRE, 1846–1917, at 439 (2013) (describing the railroad’s use of
“influence in the Pennsylvania legislature to obtain a charter” for a holding company with a “bland
and innocuous name,” which soon thereafter changed to the Southern Railway Security Company,
and which served as a “necessity in order to operate across state lines and to coordinate the activities
of railroads chartered by several different legislatures”).
90. CHURELLA, supra note 89, at 344–48, 380–82 (discussing the railroad’s need to raise its
equity ceiling and the importance of holding companies such as the Continental Improvement
Company and the Pennsylvania Company in expanding its operations outside the state, noting that
“[e]ven for a company that was as politically well connected as the PRR, the process of obtaining
charters was fraught with pitfalls, ranging from hostile amendments to gubernatorial vetoes”).
91. See Hamill, supra note 77, at 101 n.79, 102 nn.85–86, 104 n.94 (collecting first general
incorporation statutes). Most notable for broad purpose language were Iowa’s 1847 act (allowing
incorporation of “any business which may be the lawful subject of a general partnership, including
the establishment of ferries, the construction of railroads, and other works of internal
improvement”); Minnesota’s 1858 act (allowing incorporation for “transaction of any lawful
business”); Nebraska’s 1864 act (allowing incorporation for “any lawful business”); Oregon’s 1862
act (allowing incorporation for “any lawful enterprise, business, pursuit, or occupation”); Arkansas’
1869 act (authorizing incorporation “for . . . engaging in, or carrying on, any kind of manufacturing,
mechanical, mining or other lawful business”); and Arizona’s 1866 act (providing incorporation for
“any lawful enterprise, business, pursuit, or occupation”). Id. at 102 nn.85–86, 104 n.94.
92. Id. at 106 n.97. For example, New York’s 1875 act allowed incorporation of “any lawful
business except banking, insurance, [and] the construction and operation of railroads” and New
Jersey’s 1876 act allowed incorporation “to carry on any lawful business or purpose whatever.” Id.
93. Id. at 106.
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or “not-for-profit.”94 In 1874, Pennsylvania passed a general incorporation
law that divided corporations into three categories: religious corporations,
which were exempt from property taxes; for-profit corporations, which were
taxable; and non-profit corporations, which were tax-exempt.95 As historian
Jonathan Levy has observed, “This was a new classification of corporate
identity.”96 While the utility of the purpose clause as a coordinating
mechanism waned as broad and generic statements became permissible, this
function was not altogether lost as new categories arose.
And thus by the late 1880s, when New Jersey famously passed
groundbreaking legislation allowing corporations greater flexibility, such as
to own stock in other corporations, the evolution to general purpose clauses
was already largely underway.97 Ultimately, to fully rid themselves of the
corruption problem in special chartering, states adopted provisions in their
constitutions that prohibited issuing corporate charters through special
legislation.98
B.

The Rise of Corporate Brands, Missions, and Purposes
In the typical telling of the move to general incorporation and generic
statements of corporate purpose, the story quickly moves along to the
contemporary moment in which corporate law is perceived to be broadly
enabling of private purposes and to impose a shareholder primacy norm.99 In
94. Levy, supra note 28, at 218–19.
95. Id. at 218.
96. Id.
97. See Hamill, supra note 77, at 116 (explaining that “the New Jersey legislature removed
many restrictions from its general incorporation statute” in the late nineteenth century). See also
Daniel A. Crane, The Dissociation of Incorporation and Regulation in the Progressive Era and the
New Deal, in CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 109, 113 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux &
William J. Novak eds., 2017) (describing how, after the Civil War, “states began to liberalize their
incorporation statutes, with an eye toward attracting firms to incorporate in their state”); HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836–1937, at 257–58 (1991) (describing New
Jersey’s holding company statute, New York’s 1892 act, and states such as Delaware that followed
in further liberalizing their general incorporation laws); Hennessey & Wallis, supra note 62, at 91–
93 (describing how states in the 1880s and 1890s “began addressing the problem of narrow options
by widening the choice of organizational forms available to businesses and municipalities, but doing
so in a way that kept the solution to the corruption problem intact”).
98. Hilt, supra note 50, at 54. See also Hamill, supra note 77, at 87 (“For many states, the period
between the enactment of the first general incorporation law and the prohibition of incorporation by
special charter, often referred to as dual incorporation or dual period, extended for many years,
sometimes exceeding fifty.”).
99. The latter notion, that corporate law imposes a shareholder primacy norm, is a matter of
longstanding controversy and often framed as central to the corporate purpose debate. See, e.g., Leo
E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 136, 155 (2012) (arguing that observers have struggled to accept that
“corporate law requires directors, as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith strategy
to maximize profits for the stockholders”). See also Joan MacLeod Heminway, Shareholder Wealth
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between, however, there was a great flourishing of corporate brands,
missions, and social aims. Taking a broad view, we might think of these
developments as new ways that corporations began to communicate their
values and purposes once the purpose clause in the corporate charter lost
much of its specificity and public character.
Corporate brands and mass marketing began to emerge in the midnineteenth century, around the time that many states started to shift from
special chartering to general incorporation laws. This was not happenstance.
Margaret Blair has explained that “[a]s corporations emerged to organize
large scale manufacturing, transportation, and wholesale and retail trade,
business people working in these corporations devised ways to market their
products to customers across great geographic, social, and economic
distances.”100 With railroads linking different regions, for example, markets
for many types of goods became impersonal. Customers no longer knew the
people who produced goods in the marketplace and so might have questioned
the products’ quality and safety.101 Branding solved this issue:
Where corporations make and sell mass produced branded products in
many markets . . . the customer often comes to trust the branded
product first, and soon develops confidence in the competence and
ethics of individuals involved in making and selling the products
without knowing them personally because they are employed by the
corporation and identified with its brand.102
Branded goods—such as Heinz, Campbell Soup, Coca-Cola, and
Quaker Oats—had the potential to communicate to customers, employees,
and investors about the quality and values of the corporation that produced
them. The intangible aspects of branded goods and the associations and
expectations they create for a corporation are, of course, different than a
formal legal statement of purpose in a charter. They do not restrict a
corporation’s activities or create legally binding governance commitments.
Their value depends on the ongoing actions and contributions of corporate
managers and employees.103 Yet, brands could nonetheless attach to an

Maximization as a Function of Statutes, Decisional Law, and Organic Documents, 74 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 939, 940 (2017) (highlighting that academics, lawyers, and judges have taken various
views of the shareholder wealth maximization norm, characterizing it as nonexistent,
oversimplified, or a simple fact).
100. Blair, supra note 11, at 810.
101. Id. at 811 (“In a market of individual producers and shops, customers trust the quality of
the meat, bread, and candles because they trust the competence and honesty of the individual
butchers, bakers, and candlestick makers.”).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 813.
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identifiable corporate persona and form a basis around which stakeholders
and shareholders could coordinate their activity.104
The corporation as a public–private collaboration also continued, but
this too increasingly appeared outside the four corners of the corporate
charter. Corporations, and the business magnates who became wealthy from
them, began to engage in social initiatives, philanthropy, and other activities
that eventually became known as corporate social responsibility.105 Starting
in the Industrial Revolution, and with the emergence of large factory systems,
a welfare movement concerned with employee well-being pushed some
companies to create hospital clinics, recreational facilities, and profit-sharing
programs.106 Business leaders and so-called robber barons, such as Cornelius
Vanderbilt and John D. Rockefeller, were generous patrons of the arts,
endowers of educational institutions, and supporters of various community
projects.107 Many of these endeavors were in their individual capacities, but
the connection to their business empires raised one of the major issues of the
day—whether limited charter powers and a conception of managers as
trustees of shareholders’ property could create a legal basis for corporate
philanthropy.108 Some companies, such as the R. H. Macy Company in New
York, had already begun rendering assistance to social agencies in the
community by the 1870s.109
The emergent classification of the “non-profit” sector also appeared in
the late nineteenth century and, despite the splintering of categories,
maintained connections to its for-profit parallel. 110 Andrew Carnegie and
John D. Rockefeller, for example, created non-profit corporations through
which they pursued various philanthropic and social endeavors.111 The
104. See id. at 812–13 (noting that brand can attach to the corporate entity and create value that
can extend “across time and space” for numerous employees and customers who identify with the
firm, its products, and with each other).
105. See Archie B. Carroll, A History of Corporate Social Responsibility: Concepts and
Practices, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 20, 20–23
(Andrew Crane et al. eds., 2008) (describing social initiatives originating in the Industrial
Revolution and corporate philanthropy beginning in the mid-to-late 1800s).
106. Id. at 21.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 22. Other examples include the YMCA movement that began in the 1840s and spread
to the United States, and subsequently the “community chest movement.” Id. at 22–23.
110. Levy, supra note 28, at 217; Peter Dobkin Hall, A Historical Overview of Philanthropy,
Voluntary Associations, and Nonprofit Organizations in the United States, 1600–2000, in THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 32, 37 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds.,
2d ed. 2006); Jonathan Levy, Altruism and the Origins of Nonprofit Philanthropy, in
PHILANTHROPY IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, VALUES 19, 22 (Rob Reich,
Chiara Cordelli & Lucy Bernholz eds., 2016); Stanley N. Katz, Barry Sullivan & C. Paul Beach,
Legal Change and Legal Autonomy: Charitable Trusts in New York, 1777–1893, 3 L. & HIST. REV.
51, 51 (1985).
111. Levy, supra note 28, at 219.
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Rockefeller Foundation’s 1913 charter articulated its purpose as promoting
“the well-being of mankind throughout the world.”112 As reflected in this
example, the purposes of some non-profits became increasingly open-ended,
culminating in the “general purpose foundation.”113 This development not
only paralleled the evolution to the open-ended for-profit purpose clause, but
in many instances these foundations also represented the philanthropic arm
of a business corporation or its founder. Whereas during the early American
period, the quasi-public purpose of the business corporation could be found
in its charter, during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries this
began to be found in the charters of related non-profits.
A closer analogue to the charter’s purpose clause also emerged later
with the advent of corporate mission statements. The term “mission” was
reportedly first used by Jesuit monks, and subsequently in other religious
settings and the military, before finding its way into the business lexicon in
the mid-twentieth century.114 A “mission statement” became understood as
expressing “the fundamental purpose specific to an organisation.”115 By
1973, Peter Drucker wrote: “A business is not defined by its name, statutes,
or articles of incorporation. It is defined by the business mission. Only a clear
definition of the mission and purpose of the organization makes possible
clear and realistic business objectives.”116
By the 1980s, mission statements became widely used in corporations
as part of the strategic management process.117 Philosophies on how they
should be formulated and used started to blossom, and business research on
their role and impact on employees, stakeholders, and firm performance grew
steadily.118 Some models for developing mission statements involved
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Aurel Brudan, Mission Statements as Strategic Management Tools—A Brief History,
PERFORMANCE MAGAZINE (June 26, 2010), https://www.performancemagazine.org/missionstatements-as-strategic-management-tools-%E2%80%93-a-brief-history/ [https://perma.cc/XBE3YMWF].
115. Id.
116. Fred R. David, How Companies Define Their Mission, 22 LONG RANGE PLAN. 90, 90
(1989) (quoting Peter Drucker).
117. Inés Alegre, Jasmina Berbegal-Mirabent, Adrián Guerrero & Marta Mas-Machuca, The
Real Mission of the Mission Statement: A Systematic Review of the Literature, 24 J. MGMT. & ORG.
456, 461 (2018); Brudan, supra note 114.
118. See, e.g., Mohammad Taghi Alavi & Azhdar Karami, Managers of Small and Medium
Enterprises: Mission Statement and Enhanced Organisational Performance, 28 J. MGMT. DEV.
555, 561 (2009) (finding that there is “a significant and positive correlation” between firm
performance and having a written mission statement); Christopher Kenneth Bart & Mark C. Baetz,
The Relationship Between Mission Statements and Firm Performance: An Exploratory Study, 35 J.
MGMT. STUD. 823, 827 (1998) (explaining that commonly mentioned performance benefits
associated with mission statements include: (1) better staff and managerial motivation toward
achieving a common purpose, and (2) a more focused use of corporate resources); Jerome H. Want,
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multiple components, including identification of the corporation’s target
customers, principal offering, geographic markets, core technologies, selfconcept, commitment to survival, growth, and profitability, and concern for
public image and employees.119
Harkening back to the connection between the self-governance and
purpose provisions in early corporate charters, the rise of mission statements
suggests there is an operational need for an articulated purpose around which
corporate participants can coordinate their activity. It is also possible that
corporations have multiple purposes or objectives and mission statements
comfortably fit a managerial need or intuition to focus strategy on the
company’s “essential subsystems.”120 Researchers have found, however, that
the publicly available mission statements of U.S. public companies tend to
be “platitudes” and “rife with clichés.”121 They often lack specific,
measurable goals and fail to provide direction for the corporation’s efforts or
differentiation from competitors.122
Some companies have nonetheless become widely known for their
missions that closely align with their corporate brand. One of the best-known
examples is Ben & Jerry’s, incorporated in 1977 by its two eponymous
founders. Early on, the ice-cream makers adopted a social mission to pursue
the “double bottom line” and prioritize not only profits but also communities,
employees, and the environment.123 The purpose clause in the company’s
charter did not refer to this social mission, stating that its purpose was:
[t]o engage in the production, manufacture, and distribution, at both
wholesale and retail, of ice cream . . . together with other food and
beverages . . . [and] carry on any other lawful business whatsoever in
connection with any of the foregoing or which is calculated directly or
indirectly to promote the interests of the Corporation . . . .124
Years later, in 2000, when the multinational conglomerate Unilever
acquired Ben & Jerry’s, the company amended its charter to include an even
more streamlined, standard purpose clause: “The purpose of the Corporation
is to engage in any lawful act or activity for which corporations may be
Corporate Mission, 75 MGMT. REV. 46, 47 (1986) (emphasizing the importance of mission
development to effective firm performance).
119. John A. Pearce II & Fred David, Corporate Mission Statements: The Bottom Line, 1 ACAD.
MGMT. EXECUTIVE 109, 109 (1987); David, supra note 116, at 192.
120. Tamara Belinfanti & Lynn Stout, Contested Visions: The Value of Systems Theory for
Corporate Law, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 610, 619–20 (2018).
121. Lance Leuthesser & Chiranjeev Kohli, Corporate Identity: The Role of Mission
Statements, 40 BUS. HORIZONS 59, 61, 65 (1997).
122. Id. at 65.
123. George A. Mocsary, Freedom of Corporate Purpose, 2016 BYU L. REV. 1319, 1377;
Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law and the Sale of a Social
Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L. REV. 211, 219–21 (2010).
124. Mocsary, supra note 123, at 1377–78.
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organized under the Vermont Business Corporation Act.”125 Notably, Ben &
Jerry’s simultaneously adopted a lengthy mission statement, which provided
in part: “We have a progressive, nonpartisan social mission that seeks to meet
human needs and eliminate injustices in our local, national and international
communities by integrating these concerns into our day-to-day business
activities. Our focus is on children and families, the environment, and
sustainable agriculture on family farms.”126 Despite criticism at times for
some changes in its practices, the company, run as a subsidiary of Unilever,
has continued to engage in a wide range of activities reflecting this social
mission.127
Another example of a company known for its mission is Hobby Lobby,
a closely held corporation that operates a nationwide chain of arts and crafts
stores. Hobby Lobby’s stock is co-owned by five family members.128 Its
charter includes a seventeen-paragraph purpose clause that extensively
recites various types of business in which the corporation could engage and
language authorizing the pursuit of “any . . . lawful business . . . calculated
directly or indirectly to promote the interest of the Corporation or to enhance
the value of its property.”129 The charter does not refer to religion or a
religious purpose.130 Instead, the company has publicized a separate, nonbinding “statement of purpose” providing that “the Board of Directors is
committed to . . . [h]onoring the Lord in all we do by operating the company
in a manner consistent with Biblical principles.”131 It provides several other
points, including the “commit[ment] to . . . [p]roviding a return on the
owners’ investment, sharing the Lord’s blessings with our employees, and
investing in our community.”132 Hobby Lobby takes other actions, also
outside of its formal corporate documents, to communicate this mission, such
as buying full-page newspaper ads that invite people to “know Jesus as Lord
and Savior.”133
***
The changing practices for corporate purpose clauses reflected, and
helped shape, the great transformation of U.S. business corporations in the
nineteenth century. Pressed by powerful business interests and driven by
desires to combat political corruption, promote economic growth, and reduce

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 1378 n.313.
Id. at 1378.
Page & Katz, supra note 123, at 242–48.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 702–03 (2014).
Mocsary, supra note 123, at 1379–80.
Id. at 1380.
Id. (emphasis added); Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 703.
Mocsary, supra note 123, at 1380.
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 703.
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administrative burdens, states adopted waves of legislation shifting the
system from special chartering to general incorporation.
With these changes emerged new practices as corporations found novel
ways of communicating with stakeholders and shareholders about their
values, purposes, and missions. Notions of corporate purpose as a matter of
business and law proliferated, untethered to legal expression through the
corporate charter. Ultimately, as purpose clauses lost their specificity,
fiduciary duty doctrine also evolved, as courts asked not whether the
corporate fiduciary was faithfully pursuing the articulated purpose but
instead whether they pursued the interests of the corporation and its
shareholders.134 Subsequently, the twentieth-century debate about “corporate
purpose” centered on these emerging themes of the fiduciary duties owed by
directors to shareholders and the developing issues of corporate philanthropy
and social responsibility.135
III. The Modern Revival of the Purpose Clause
Amidst the great changes discussed in the previous Part, the purpose
clause of the corporate charter became a subject of diminished interest. As a
measure of perceived irrelevance, since the turn of the twentieth century, only
a small number of law review articles have focused on the topic of purpose
clauses in U.S. business corporation charters—one of the most recent is
several decades old and argues for abolishing their compulsory inclusion.136
Yet, as this Article aims to show, the purpose clause has enduring
relevance even as the debate on corporate purpose shifts because it remains
a tool for coordinating long-term ventures and associations, and it still
134. See Ciepley, supra note 4, at 73–74 (describing the shift from corporate directors as
purpose fiduciaries to shareholder primacy); Miller & Gold, supra note 25, at 536–38 (describing
how business corporations can be understood to implicate “fiduciary governance,” in which duties
are owed to fulfilling the corporation’s purpose, or “service governance,” in which duties are owed
to shareholder beneficiaries); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L.
277, 279 (1998) (describing how the shareholder primacy norm was first used by courts to resolve
disputes among majority and minority shareholders).
135. See supra note 1.
136. Michael A. Schaeftler, The Purpose Clause in the Certificate of Incorporation: A Clause
in Search of a Purpose, 58 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 476, 477 (1984). For a perspective on the purpose
clause in Chinese charters, see generally Li-Wen Lin, Say on Purpose: Lessons from Chinese
Corporate Charters, 19 J. CORP. L. STUDIES 251 (2019). Scholarly and practice-oriented literature
reflects enduring use and focus on purpose clauses in nonprofit corporation charters, LLCs, and
partnerships. See, e.g., Johnny Rex Buckles, Curbing (or Not) Foreign Influence on U.S. Politics
and Policies Through Federal Taxation of Charities, 79 MD. L. REV. 590, 622–23 (2020)
(describing norms of obedience to corporate purpose in nonprofit charters); Peter Molk, How Do
LLC Owners Contract Around Default Statutory Protections?, 42 J. CORP. L. 503, 542 (2017)
(finding that over half of Delaware and New York operating agreements in a sample study narrowed
the LLC’s business purpose); Thomas E. Rutledge, Purpose: If You Do Not Know Where You Are
Going, How Will You Know If You Have Arrived, 20 J. PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES 37, 37–39 (2017)
(discussing the practice of narrowing purpose clauses in LLC and partnership organic documents).
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reflects the public–private collaboration that is at the heart of the corporate
enterprise. This final Part examines two contemporary illustrations of these
points—the duty of good faith and the benefit corporation form.
A.

Rediscovering the Public Aims of the Purpose Clause through the Duty
of Good Faith
As a result of the general incorporation movement, states enabled
chartering a for-profit corporation without specification as to its activity,
subject to the requirement that it be for a lawful purpose.137 Delaware’s
General Corporation Law provides, for example: “A corporation may be
incorporated or organized under this chapter to conduct or promote any
lawful business or purposes, except as may otherwise be provided by the
Constitution or other law of this State.”138 The vast majority of corporations
have adopted broad, boilerplate purpose clauses, or use the “any lawful
purpose” language.139
As noted, scholars and commentators sometimes take this allowance for
great freedom of operation without specification as a sign that the clause is
meaningless.140 Although states got rid of the requirement of listing specific
corporate powers and purposes, they did not, however, dispense with the
clause entirely or the requirement that the corporation’s purpose be
“lawful.”141 As Kent Greenfield has recounted, even the strongest proponents
for ending the ultra vires doctrine assumed that corporations would be
chartered only for lawful purposes and would not have authority to commit
acts “repugnant to law.”142 There is a long history of understanding that
corporations may not act contrary to the charter or the law of the land.143 And,
as I have pointed out elsewhere, although the statutes typically refer to the
137. Some variation in statutory language exists across states. Schaeftler, supra note 136,
at 476 n.1.
138. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2019–2020).
139. Schaeftler, supra note 136, at 483.
140. See, e.g., id. at 481 (“Since the demise of the ultra vires doctrine, the purpose clause
ostensibly now serves to define the scope of management’s authority rather than corporate capacity.
Nevertheless, the relationship between corporate management’s desire to discern the extent of its
authority and the existence of a publicly filed purpose clause is tenuous at best.”).
141. Greenfield, supra note 48, at 1316; Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, 68 DUKE
L.J. 710, 719–20 (2019).
142. Greenfield, supra note 48, at 1316 (quoting Professor Robert Stevens’s proposal in 1927
for a uniform act that would discontinue the ultra vires doctrine).
143. See, e.g., Bilder, supra note 5, at 508–09 (discussing “the colonial American practice of
bounded legislation under a repugnancy standard” and arguing that the “Founding generation
presumed a practice of constitutional judicial review as an outgrowth of the experience of
constraining corporate and colonial legislation by the laws of the nation”); Bowie, supra note 5, at
1417–18 (noting the Massachusetts Bay Company charter prohibited the corporation from imposing
laws or punishments “contrarie or repugnant to the lawes and statut[e]s of this our realme of
England” and entitled Britons living under the corporation’s jurisdiction to “all liberties and
immunities of free and natural subjects…within the realme of England”).
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granting of charters for a lawful purpose, courts and commentators have
interpreted the language to broadly refer to an ongoing obligation of lawful
business operation.144 Unlawful acts become subject to the enforcement
powers of corporate law in addition to governmental or private entities
charged with enforcing the underlying law.145
Stemming from this statutory language regarding chartering
corporations for a lawful purpose, courts have held corporate fiduciaries to
the dual requirements of legal obedience and oversight as part of their duty
of good faith.146 These obligations serve a public function.147 Directors may
not, consistent with their fiduciary obligations, choose to violate the law even
if they believe it will benefit the corporation or its shareholders.148 The
requirement of fidelity to the law aims to protect society’s interests and, in
that way, echoes early American corporate charters that used specific
articulations of corporate purpose to direct businesses’ energies toward
quasi-public purposes.
Recent developments in the corporate oversight doctrine further reflect
this understanding of public expectations on corporate directors. Under
current law, a failure to make a good faith effort to put in place a board-level
system of monitoring and reporting for legal compliance constitutes a breach
of the duty of loyalty.149 This obligation has spurred corporations and their
boards of directors to develop compliance programs that aim to monitor and
prevent activity outside the bounds of lawfully permissible activity.150 And
Delaware courts have finally started to show that their jurisprudence on
oversight liability—known as the Caremark doctrine—actually has some
bite. From recent cases involving food safety regulations to clinical trial
protocols for drug development, courts have displayed a critical eye in

144. Pollman, supra note 141, at 721.
145. Greenfield, supra note 48, at 1281–82.
146. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006); Stone v. Ritter, 911
A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006). See also Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Oversight and Disobedience,
72 VAND. L. REV. 2013, 2044–45 (2019) (examining the body of Delaware law concerning the
oversight and obedience aspects of the duty of good faith).
147. Pollman, supra note 146, at 2026.
148. Id.
149. In re Caremark Intl. Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 967, 969–70 (Del. Ch. 1996); Stone, 911 A.2d at
370; Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 809 (Del. 2019).
150. Donald C. Langevoort, Caremark and Compliance: A Twenty-Year Lookback, 90 TEMPLE
L. REV. 727, 728 (2013) (“Since [Caremark], compliance has grown in size, scope, and stature at
nearly all large corporations.”). See also Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance,
50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 967 (2009) (“[L]awyers and compliance providers responded to Caremark by
expanding the level of services available to help directors ensure that proper systems were in place
to prevent and detect criminal violations.”); Claire A. Hill, Caremark as Soft Law, 90 TEMP. L. REV.
681, 681 (2018) (arguing Caremark has been “extremely influential” in getting corporations to
“spend considerable amounts of time and money ‘complying’ with what are now called Caremark
duties”).
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reviewing claims that directors have consciously failed to carry out their
public-regarding responsibility.151
B.

Redesigning the Purpose Clause for Benefit Corporations
Another reflection of the enduring relevance of the purpose clause has
arrived with the new social enterprise forms of the twenty-first century, most
notably the benefit corporation. Social entrepreneurs have catalyzed state
legislatures across the country to offer the specialized legal form that enables
the dual pursuit of profit and social purpose.152
The key distinctive feature of the benefit corporation is that it must have
a corporate purpose stated in its charter that incorporates the specific type of
benefits listed in the statute.153 Central to the design of benefit corporations
is thus an embrace of using the purpose clause to express specific values and
objectives, somewhat akin to historical practices, yet without the concerns
about inefficiency and corruption that led to reform of special chartering.
Many states have adopted model legislation drafted by the non-profit
proponent of the benefit corporation form, B Lab, which requires creating a
“general public benefit,” defined as a “material positive impact on society
and the environment, taken as a whole.”154 The model legislation also permits
a benefit corporation to additionally have a “specific public benefit” and
gives examples such as “improving human health,” “promoting economic
opportunities for individuals or communities beyond the creation of jobs,”
and “promoting the arts, sciences, or advancement of knowledge.”155
Delaware has adopted its own public benefit corporation statute, which
requires identifying in the charter “one or more specific public benefits to be
promoted by the corporation” in addition to the general public benefit
purpose.156 It defines “public benefit” to mean “a positive effect (or reduction
of negative effects) on 1 or more categories of persons, entities, communities

151. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 821–23; In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Deriv. Litig., 2019 WL
4850188, at *10 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019). For a discussion of how boards can integrate employee,
environmental, social, and governance factors into their corporate compliance responsibilities, see
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Kirby M. Smith & Reilly S. Steel, Caremark and ESG, Perfect Together: A
Practical Approach to Implementing an Integrated, Efficient, and Effective Caremark and EESG
Strategy, IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 2–4), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
Papers.cfm?abstract_id=3664021 [https://perma.cc/SN85-CARH].
152. Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. 681, 683
(2013).
153. See Heminway, supra note 99, at 965 (noting benefit corporation statutes only cover firms
with a corporate purpose that meets statutory requirements).
154. MODEL BENEFIT CORPORATION LEGISLATION §§ 102, 201 (B LAB 2017), https://
benefitcorp.net/attorneys/model-legislation [https://perma.cc/RX6G-DTW5].
155. Id. § 102.
156. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a)(1) (2021).
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or interests (other than stockholders in their capacities as stockholders).”157
The requirement of stating a specific public benefit was seemingly intended
to provide a focus for the board—a “counterweight to the strong pull of
shareholder primacy”—and to give investors notice of, and some control
over, the public purposes that the corporation serves.158
Although approaches to purpose taken by these statutes may be broad
and vague,159 and benefit corporations have followed in turn by adopting
clauses that suffer from the same flaws,160 the underlying effort to revive
corporations expressly serving public and private aims is clear. Corporate
purpose is central to the benefit corporation model across various states’
approaches—and specifically the use of express statements in the corporate
charter.161
However imperfect the result, it is notable that the purpose clause was
the tool that social entrepreneurs wanted to use to try to create credible
commitments around which investors, employees, and customers could
coordinate their activity.162 Although charters can be changed, they have
legal import, and their amendment requires formal action by the board of
directors and the shareholders—thus leading benefit corporation advocates
to view purpose clauses as a means of encoding social aims into the DNA of
the company. Mission statements might similarly reflect values beyond the
pursuit of profits, but they do not convey the weight of a legal commitment
in the manner achieved by expressing such purpose in the constitutional
document of the corporation. Likewise, corporate philanthropy can provide
important support for social aims, but it is a discretionary expense that may
be easily altered in contrast to an ongoing obligation embedded in the charter
to operate the business in pursuit of specified public benefits.

157. Id. § 362(b).
158. Frederick H. Alexander, Putting Benefit Corporation Statutes into Context by Putting
Context into the Statutes, 76 BUS. LAW. 109, 139 & n.126 (2020).
159. See John Tyler et al., Producing Better Mileage: Advancing the Design and Usefulness of
Hybrid Vehicles for Social Business Ventures, 33 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 235, 288 (2015) (arguing
that “approaches to purpose taken by corporate hybrid forms are extraordinarily broad, and vague,
about how purposes relate to each other, and thus susceptible to financial profit motives overtaking
or at least being on par with social purposes”).
160. See Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The “Value” of a Public Benefit
Corporation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE PURPOSE AND PERSONHOOD (Elizabeth
Pollman & Robert B. Thompson eds.) (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2) (examining a sample
of the most economically significant PBCs and finding that their purposes statements are “in most
cases, too vague and aspirational to be legally significant, or even to serve as a reliable tool for
evaluating whether corporate decisionmakers are adhering to the PBC’s social mission”).
161. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk in Publicly Held U.S.
Benefit Corporations, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 611, 619–21 (2017).
162. COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND HOW
TO RESTORE TRUST IN IT 29–30 (2013); Bart Houlahan, Andrew Kassoy & Jay Coen Gilbert,
Benefit Corporations and the Firm Commitment Universe, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 299, 300 (2017).
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History suggests that the purpose clause in the benefit corporation will
continue to be the basis of experimentation and evolution. The inherent
tension between creating commitments and protecting flexibility runs from
the time of special chartering corporations with a quasi-public purpose and
the era of the ultra vires doctrine to general incorporation and the flourishing
of intangible brands and mission statements. The greater specificity of
commitment, the greater potential for focus and accountability; however, this
may come at the expense of flexibility, as we see from the history of
corporations in the nineteenth century that pushed against the constraints of
their charters. Corporations often embraced the freedom to state their
purposes with generality, particularly as the prevalence of consumer
cooperative-like business corporations declined and as manufacturing and
industrial corporations sought to provide products and services across greater
expanses. Whether benefit corporations can achieve a balance in their
purpose clauses between meaningful commitment and productive flexibility
remains to be seen in the modern era, as does the success of the broader
experiment of this form of social enterprise.
Conclusion
Throughout corporate history, charters have contained purpose clauses.
Early corporate charters often included provisions for self-governance and
specific expressions of corporate purpose that served as a coordinating
mechanism for participants. The expression of purpose in early corporate
charters often additionally reflected collaboration between what we now
think of as public and private spheres. Corporations were vehicles for
entrepreneurial action that often served broader social aims and engendered
heated public debate. Although corporate chartering practices have evolved
in significant ways over the past two centuries, corporate purpose clauses
have remained an important reflection of public–private collaboration.
The modern practice of allowing corporations to broadly state their
purpose as pursuing “any lawful activity” still reflects a public-regarding
limit on corporate activity, as contemporary case law on the fiduciary duty of
good faith recognizes. Further, the longstanding requirement of stating a
purpose in the corporate charter has laid the groundwork for a contemporary
revival in its use by corporations as a mechanism for creating and
coordinating commitments to pursue public benefits. The purpose clause has
enduring relevance even as new practices and understandings of corporate
purpose have emerged in business and law.

